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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we assess the possibility of a critical 
knowledge of technology. In the case of facial 
recognition systems, ‘FRS’, we argue that 
behaviorism underlies this technology, and analyze 
the debate about behaviorism to show the lack of 
consensus about its theoretical foundations. In 
particular we analyze the structure of knowledge 
generated by FRS as affected by a technological 
behaviorism. Our last point is a suggestion to use the 
concept of ‘critical knowledge’, which we borrow 
from Ladrière, to question and challenge the 
technological finalities and the foundational 
scientific theory underlying FRS. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Our paper is part of the activities developed by the 
MIAUCE project, a European research project 
involving university researchers, industrials and 
marketing staff [1]. This project raises the question of 
multi-modal technology. We here focus on the 
scenario of the design and use of interactive web-TV 
technology, scenario that entails among others the 
design and use of facial recognition systems, 
hereafter ‘FRS’, so as to link facial physical stimuli 
and emotions when a certain kind of web information 
arises. In this project, societal, ethical and legal issues 
of this kind of technology are explored by a research 
group from the social sciences of the University of 
Namur. One of the main questions which emerge is 
the possibility to found a technological innovation 
more acceptable and which takes into account ethical 
and legal issues in its design. 
In order to reach these aims, we propose in this 
paper to analyze the possibility to apply to 
technology what Ladrière has called ‘critical 
knowledge’. Critical knowledge, as we will see it, 
would create the conditions for the possibility for 
ethical attitudes in technological development and 
scientific knowledge. We here develop as example 
facial recognition technologies, hereafter ‘FRS’, to 
illustrate the feasibility of the application of a critical 
knowledge analysis in the field of engineering ethics. 
In order, we first explore the theoretical 
foundations at the basis of facial recognition systems. 
We show how the idea of behaviorist theoretical 
attitude underlines the design of the facial recognition 
systems under examination here. We also categorize 
types of behaviorist theories according to their 
radicalism, so as to render as possible 
epistemological assessment of impacts on facial 
recognition systems. This will lead to the suggestion 
that a critical knowledge analysis is possible to reflect 
on behaviorism as pre-formatting theory underlying 
facial recognition systems.  
Lastly, we assess the conditions of possibility for a 
critical knowledge analysis.  
 
2. Facial Recognition Systems: A 
Behaviorist System? 
 
2.1. Behaviorism: Definition 
 
According to Sellars, behaviorists are researchers 
exploring behaviors as tools to be interpreted to 
acquire knowledge and understanding of individual 
psychologies. To these researchers, Sellars argues, 
behaviors are the starting point for an enquiring 
process of drawing and testing hypotheses about 
“psychological events” [2]. If we follow this 
definition, behaviorists are thus theorists on 
individual psychologies calling in to behaviorism as 
tool for exploration. 
 
Behaviorism, as a doctrine, involves some 
different claims. This can be shown through a 
classification of the kinds of behaviorism according 
to their historical roots, and, especially, according to 
their finalities. We here distinguish between 
‘methodological’ behaviorism, ‘psychological’ or 
‘radical’ behaviorism and ‘analytical’ or 
‘philosophical’ behaviorism [3].  
First, ‘methodological’ behaviorists claim that 
mental states ought not to be looked at in empirical 
studies. Rather, methodological behaviorists turn 
their attention to the scientific conduct of psychology, 
the latter being seen as the science of behaviour, not 
of the mind. Historically this trend started with the 
logical positivism developed by the Vienna Circle 
during the 1920s and 1930s [4], which called for the 
unification of all scientific endeavours, be they on the 
natural, human or technological worlds.  
Second, following on Vienna logical positivism 
too, ‘analytical’ behaviorists take a more 
philosophical stance as regards to the meaning and 
semantics of mental terms. These behaviorists tend to 
be more concerned about the structure of our mental 
concepts and the possibility to eliminate some of 
them. That is, they work by looking out for mental 
concepts that could be eliminated and replaced with, 
translated into, physical concepts [5].  
Third, ‘psychological’ behaviorists prefer to 
explain human and animal behaviors solely in terms 
of external physical stimuli. The more ‘radicals’ 
among them go up to sustaining scientific theories in 
which mental states are explain by physical states 
(included environmental influence). John Locke 
(1632-1704) and David Hume (1711-1776) are the 
foremost British empiricists at the roots of this 
thought. 
 
 
2.2. Facial Recognition and Methodological 
Behaviorism 
 
With visages being seen as the mirror to the mind, 
facial recognition systems, hereafter ‘FRS’, are often 
used in multimodal analysis of (potential) users’ and 
consumers’ behaviors. It is the case for the MIAUCE 
project. The procedure at stake here is as follows. 
First, the camera captures a face, and fits it with a 
virtual mask. This mask is then prepared for the 
interpretation of facial expressions through by a 
frame made of coding points being attached to 
specific areas and lines on the face. This particular 
coding frame is then compared to measures 
calculated on a large sample of population expressing 
specific chosen emotions. Thereafter, a particular 
facial expression under examination is decoded and 
interpreted using a grammar of basic emotions such 
as anger, sadness, happiness, etc. There is also a 
system for the quantification of this intensity of these 
emotions on the facial capture. 
Our argument here is that FRS is embodiment of a 
methodological behaviorism approach to individual 
subjectivity. Although engineers may not be 
psychologists, they translate into the devices the 
methodological behaviorism concepts implicit to the 
results obtained by the psychologists consulted 
during the elaboration stage of the devices. In the 
specific context of MIAUCE, this process is 
particularly strong due to the close-knit collaboration 
between behaviorist psychologists and engineers in 
charge of the design of FRS. FRS, as they are to be 
used in the MIAUCE technologies, can thus be seen 
as an expression of the particular psychological 
methodology of methodological behaviorism. 
Related, we wish also to argue that this type of 
system and the related technology lead to a new kind 
of behaviorism, technological behaviorism, which we 
explore and question throughout the rest of this paper 
as regards to its actual knowledge-production 
capacity and as regards to its ethical implications.  
 
3. Behaviorism: A Fallacy? 
 
Behaviorism has long been in the centre of heated 
debates, for it is often challenged as to its usefulness 
as well as to the risk of the false conclusions it can 
generate about mental states and mind and sensible 
experiences such as emotions  
 
3.1. Epistemological Critics of Behaviorism  
 
A first critique originates in the concept of 
reinforcement much used by behaviorists [6]. 
Reinforcement means an increase of the strength of a 
response following on changes in the direct 
environment, by a causal and deterministic relation. 
In the MIAUCE technology, that is interactive web-
TV, this concept is very present. Indeed the basic 
model at work implies the presupposition that facial 
expressions and emotions are directly caused by the 
sole change in the visualized TV images. With the 
‘environment’, that is the TV, being cast as an 
exogenous factor causing deterministically changes 
in emotions and facial expression, the MIAUCE FRS 
is very much in line with this behaviorist notion of 
reinforcement. We would think that there are issues 
here with a potential denial of individual 
subjectivities and of the personal and social 
representations of environments.  
This shows, we would argue, in some studies by 
philosophers of mind when they explore and exploit 
the philosophical concept of ‘quale’, qualia in plural 
form [7]. In our understanding, qualia can help 
showing off incompleteness inherent to the concept 
of reinforcement. Qualia are a philosophical concept 
referring the properties of sensitive experience. These 
properties of sensitive experience may be defined as 
follows. They are not communicable except by direct 
experience, they are not relational, they are not 
comparable with others qualia, and they can only be 
understood directly by consciousness. In other words, 
these qualia, which form the real sensitive 
experience, are showing out only through the mental, 
thinking experience. This is why it is impossible or 
incomplete to describe any mental state related to a 
sensitive experience, such as ‘fear’ only in physical 
words, let not say a computerized model of emotions. 
Our concerns here is that, in that sense, 
behaviorism implies a deterministic view of the 
human being, who is reduced to his/her physical 
features. In the behaviorist frame described above, 
both the autonomy of the individuals and the 
subjectivity are denied. Against this objection, some 
behaviorist psychologists insist on their practice of 
cross-examinations using both physical and 
environmental stimuli. However some among them 
also counter-argue, claiming that physical features 
can not necessarily express individual subjectivity. 
Thus, there are major ethical issues raised by the 
criticisms about the lack of epistemological outputs 
from behaviorist theories – which we explore later. 
Still it may useful however to check out on the 
potential scientific contributions from the latter.  
 
3.2. To Take or Not To Take a Behaviorist 
Stance? 
 
One first reason to defend a behaviorist approach 
to mental states, and one that is well exploited by 
behaviorists, is the vigorous desire to understand the 
nature of humans. With psychologists providing 
plenty of material underlining the links between 
beliefs and emotions on the one hand and kinds of 
behavior on the other, it is indeed tempting to reduce 
mental states to behaviors so as to explore the 
working of the human mind. In that sense, the 
popularity of behaviorism is thus connected to a quite 
natural desire to understand the structure of human 
being, and, especially, the mind, in understandable 
terms. For providing answers to the question as ‘how’ 
about the human mind, behaviorism, as a reductionist 
theory of mental state, permits to work ahead and 
generate understanding.  
Another reason to defend defense of behaviorism 
emerges from the works of Skinner [8], an opponent 
to simply inner mental explanatory causes of 
behaviors. In his opinion, only behaviorists are 
capable of stating on the innate rules by which 
emotions and bodily expressions can be explored. 
That is, mental states must be explained in terms 
which do not involves mental states themselves. 
Skinner’s argument originates in the circularity 
paradoxes to be found in mental definition. How 
could we explain mental state without using mental 
states itself? If we explain mental states in such a 
circular way, we can only end up developing an 
innate approach and analysis of mental states. This 
position is quite a negative defense – it pushes 
behaviorism by stating on a defect it does not have -, 
and as a result, we would argue that he somehow lost 
sight of the consequences and implications of 
behaviorism itself. Indeed, Skinner, who has been 
severely criticized, goes in other places up to 
proposing a social worldview from his views on 
behaviorism, suggesting paradoxes and subjective 
problems in his behaviorism, among others an 
aversion to free will and autonomous being [9].   
 
4. Facial Recognition Systems, Engineers 
and Critical Knowledge 
 
Earlier in this paper, we have shown how FRS are 
closely although implicitly linked to behaviorism. 
This was shown to especially the case to the 
methodological behaviorism. What this has suggested 
too is that a specificity of behaviorism is that to 
become potentially integrated in a technology, 
through the particular structure of knowledge its use 
in the design of the technology entails. Thus, the 
technological degree of behaviorism displayed in 
FRS also entails a particular way to think, a 
technological knowledge. At this effect, we would 
argue here for the possibility for, and use of, what we 
call ‘critical knowledge’. 
 
4.1. The goal-directedness of technological 
engineering? 
 
When the doctrine of behaviorism came in to the 
field of FRS technology, we would argue that a 
teleological turning point was reached, as this advent 
entails another structure of knowledge. By 
teleological, we mean here that a sense of purpose is 
inherent to technology, and that the structure of 
knowledge is directed towards specific ends, be they 
financial, political, economical, industrial, etc.  
Indeed scientists’ activities, as we said before, are 
geared towards looking for answers to ‘how’ of the 
world’s operation, i.e. how the mind thinks or how 
algorithm can involve behavior. So as to explore 
what the incursion of ends and teleology means in the 
domain of a technological development, we would 
argue to think about technological engineering as an 
activity that tends to answer questions of the ‘for-
what’ [10]. In this case, the purpose-geared aspects 
of technological engineering are obvious; 
technological design can be seen as the gradual 
“construction of means more and more efficient to 
realize some purposes” [11]. For this reason, we 
argue that facial recognition systems require 
reflecting about their structure and features. We 
present briefly in the next section the conditions to 
set up for making possible critical knowledge  Due to 
the teleogical turning point in the field of 
technological design pointed above, there is a serious 
need to take into account the ethical issues raised up 
by these activities. Moreover, ethical issues, as we 
have said, also entail reflecting upon the early 
doctrine that permits the making of the technology, 
i.e. in this case about FRS behaviorism. 
 
4.2. Critical Knowledge 
 
To be thorough, our ethical reflection has to be 
concerned with the whole of the process of the 
technological design, from the early behaviorist 
doctrine involved to the later implementation of 
technology into the society. Towards this end, it may 
be useful, we suggest, to think about scientific 
knowledge, alongside, Jean Ladrière, philosopher and 
scientist, as ‘critical knowledge’ [12]. In Ladrière’s 
terms, critical knowledge means that, during the 
process of technological innovation, a habit of regular 
overviewing advancement is needed to assess and 
judge impacts of technological practices. “A critical 
knowledge,” Ladrière underlines, “ought be able to 
self assess, to identify and discern within itself what 
is relevant according to the very activity by which it 
is constituted, and, through this, become able to 
evaluate on its own the value and boundaries of the 
validity of what it ends up proposing”  [13]. Thus, “a 
critical attitude covers at the same time on science, 
and the ways it tackles with reality, and on 
technology, and the ways it tends towards improving 
the human condition” [14].   
Ladrière’s ‘critical knowledge’ concept is 
applicable here, we would argue. Indeed, the earlier 
presentation of behaviorism frame and its 
implementation in FRS technology shows how each 
interacted with one another and start off such a 
critical knowledge process, as well as the 
epistemological critiques that have shown the strains 
between enthusiastic defenders and skeptical 
critiques. Especially, critical knowledge here means a 
critical attitude about our activities at each level, and 
also about the knowledge of the early theoretical 
implication of our technological activities.  
 
5. Closing Comments 
 
Throughout the paper, we have endeavored to 
show that a critical understanding of the processes at 
work in the making of a technology is crucial so as to 
start in earnest the exploration of its impacts and 
consequences. In particular, while finishing up with 
critical knowledge, we have pointed out that an 
analysis using this latter concept and focused on the 
societal and ethical issues of technology too implies 
the need for reflecting upon the processes that permit 
the design of a technology and render it acceptable in 
society. Now, is this to say that engineers and, in 
general, scientists ought to have their daily life filled 
with reflections on ethical, philosophical, societal and 
legal considerations? Is it that technologists ought to 
practice two or three more human-focused trades in 
same time as they design technology? No. We only 
mean to suggest that technological development and 
scientific questioning involves at some point to face 
up with a broader vision about what is being done, 
what for it is being done and, maybe also, why it is 
needed.  
 
6. References 
 
[1] See http://www.miauce.org 
 
[2] W. Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientic Image of 
Man”, Science, Perception, and reality, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, New-York, 1963, pp. 1-40. 
 
[3] G., Graham, “Behaviorism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/, 
Stanford, 2007. 
 
[4] O., Neurath, Le développement du Cercle de Vienne et 
l’avenir de l’empricisme logique, Hermann & Co, Paris, 
1936.  
 
[5] About the philosophical theories of “eliminativism” of 
mental concept see, per example, P., Churchland, Matter 
and Consciousness, MIT Press/Bradford Books, 
Massachusetts, 1984. 
 
[6] About a formalisation of “reinforcement” which shows 
a defender of behaviorism at work, see P.R., Killeen, 
“Mathematical Principles of reinforcement”, Behavioral 
and brain Sciences, 17 (1), 1994, pp. 105-172. 
 
[7] See for example, the real interesting following paper: 
N., Thomas, “What is it Like to be a Bat?”, in Mortal 
Questions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, 
pp. 165–180. 
 
[8] B. F., Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, 
Macmillan, New-York, 1953 and B. F., Skinner, About 
behaviorism, Vintage, New-York, 1974. 
 
[9] About the main and most successful critics of 
behaviorism, mainly about linguistic behaviorism, see N., 
Chomsky, “Review of Verbal Behavior”, Language, 35, pp. 
26-58 and also N., Chomsky, “The case Against B. F. 
Skinner”, New-York review of Books, 30, pp. 18-24. 
 
[10]http://www.espace-
citoyen.be/site/index.php?EsId=1&Module=mod-
produit&Indice=1-14-35, B. Hespel’s interview. 
 
[11] T., Dedeurwaerdere, “la dimension éthique dans la 
sphère de la rationalité technologique: normes, contextes et 
arrière-plans”, in Les Carnets du Centre de Philosophie du 
Droit, n°82, 2000, p. 2. We traduce. 
 
[12] J., Ladrière, Les enjeux de la rationalité. Le défi de la 
science et de la technologie aux cultures, Aubier-
Montaigne / UNESCO, Paris, 1977 and also J., Ladrière, 
L'éthique dans l'univers de la rationalité, Artel/Fides, 
Namur/Québec, 1997. 
 
[13] J., Ladrière, Les enjeux de la rationalité. Le défi de la 
science et de la technologie aux cultures, Aubier-
Montaigne / UNESCO, Paris, 1977, p. 128. We traduce. 
 
[14] B., Feltz, “Démocratie technique, inventivité éthique et 
modernité critique”, in B. Feltz and alii, Ethique, technique 
et démocratie, Academia Bruylant, 2007, p. 10. We 
traduce. 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
Part of the research for this paper has been made in 
the course of the MIAUCE research project (CNRS 
Lille, University of Glasgow, University of 
Amsterdam, University of Namur, Sylis, Tilde and 
Visual-Tools) funded by the European Commission. 
This paper also benefited from discussions held with 
Yves Poullet, Denis Darquennes and Antoinette 
Rouvroy of the Information technology and Law 
research Center (CRID) of the University of Namur. 
The authors also wish to acknowledge Sandra Mols 
who kindly agreed to review and improve the 
linguistic quality of this paper. 
 
